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In eastern Nepal, a territory historically known as Limbuwan, the Limbu 
people make up just under 400,000. Historically, this region and its people were 
accompanied by the practice of kipat, a system of land tenure and management as 
well as one of community and cultural governance. In 2021 (1964) the Land Act 
formally ended the practice of the kipat system and transferred all lands to the 
state held raikar form of tenure. With the end of the practice of kipat came the 
attempted integration of the Limbu people from their traditional governing 
systems into the burgeoning Nepali democracy. A combination of factors 
(indigenous caste status, lack of education, distance from policy making, etc.) has 
created a struggle for Limbus to find their political identiy under the Government 
of Nepal. This struggle has included the establishment of a minor political party, 
overwhelming political despair, and the compromise for many of the Limbu 
identity from the political landscape. The integration of Limbu people into the 
central government of Nepal has been incomplete and since the dissolution of the 
kipat system, the Limbu identity remains at large, unspoken for in Kathmandu.  
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 1 
Introduction 
In Nepal’s modern history, trends of ethnic politics have been at the 
forefront of political discussion. Recently centered around the Maoist Peoples 
War, waged from the 1990s to the early 2000s; this violent boiling over of 
discontent from rural populations on grounds of identity typified its urgency. The 
end of this war did not bring about the end of this discussion, as nationwide 
movements today from Dalit and Madeshi groups continue to demand 
representation and policy to reflect their identities as Nepali citizens. Despite the 
ability of these national movements to field the grievances of many, the desires of 
other groups continue to be left out of Kathmandu politics.  
Nepal’s ethnic diversity has bred a history of diverse traditional practices, 
enabling communities to navigate complicated social, political, and economic 
dilemmas. In cases of subsistence farming communities, a common variety in 
Nepal, one of the most salient practices is the management of land and the rights 
to its access. Limbu communities of Eastern Nepal could be identified by the 
kipat system, developed over centuries to mitigate this matter. As an organization 
of land tenure founded around community ownership and first-settlement rights, it 
served as a form of indigenous governance, guiding and organizing these 
communities. However, a central government grasping at the ideal of a singular 
Nepali identity amongst its astounding diversity has led to the damage of 
traditions such as kipat.  
The history and progressive deterioration of kipat is one complicated by 
both governmental histories and social histories. As stated by Thomas Cox: 
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“studying land rights shatter[s] the myth about Nepal being a country of ethnic 
harmony” and kipat’s complicated history serves as support (1990). In the late 
20th century, Lionel Caplan studied the political and social dynamics between 
Limbus and high caste Bahuns with kipat as their catalyst. He claimed that many 
social and political changes were in opposition to the process of sanskritization, a 
term coined by Srinivas as the the “process by which a “low” cast or tribe or other 
group takes over the customs, ritual, beliefs, ideology, and style of life of a high 
and, in particular, a twice-born, caste” (Caplan 2013; Srinivas 1989). A trend in 
South Asia, the stronghold of kipat throughout the 20th century stood against such 
sanskritization. Despite pressures from a high caste dominated Government of 
Nepal to abandon it, Limbus were able to practice kipat until 1968, after which 
point it was officially incorporated into federal policy.  
Kipat as a concept continues to hold traditional and cultural value to the 
Limbu people, however, its formal practice has long since come to an end. In 
Kathmandu, the Ministry of Land Reform and Management claims that kipat has 
been effectively “mainstreamed” into written policy (personal communication, 8 
Nov 2017). With many Limbus reporting that, without kipat, they have been 
stripped of all rights under the Nepali state, how effective this mainstreaming was 
remains in question.  
Pre-1968, the rights to community management – fiscally, 
organizationally, and otherwise – were held by Limbus themselves. Community 
governance was acutely visible. Despite the time that has past since its removal, it 
is necessary to explore kipat as a heritage of strong local governance, as well as 
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kipat as a concept today, in order to begin to comprehend the political condition 
of the Limbu identity. As poet Bairangi Kaila stated, “After [kipat’s] abrogation 
by the state, it is argued, the communities owning such land in the past became 
impoverished politically, socially and economically” (as cited in Adhikari, 2006). 
This research stood to explore the political tine of this impoverishment, to what 
degree it is perceived by the Limbu community, as a failed integration into the 
state of Nepal. 
 
Historical Context1 
Kipat is a traditional form of land tenure with its roots in the Kirat people 
of eastern Nepal –those of the modern Limbu and Rai ethnic groups. It derives its 
legitimacy from consanguinity, geography, and “customary occupation” (Regmi 
1976). In ancestral lands such as Limbuwan, which have been the home of people 
using this system for time immemorial, these characteristics often blend together 
into an idea of first settlement rights, and have been further codified by kipat. At 
its core, being a member of a particular ethnic group entitled participation. As the 
sale or purchase of lands were prohibited under this system, the rights to land 
were extended solely based upon the traceability of patrilineal heritage. Such a 
system of ethic based natural resource management ensured that kipat 
communities remained of a single ethnic identity. As no outsider could enter the 
                                                
1 For further historical context for this changes, the author recommends consulting 
John Whelpton’s History of Nepal. While this historical context is integral to fully 
understanding this contemporary dynamic, it is not the purpose nor the 
expectation of this paper to attempt to fully explore it. 
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system, rights remained within a community traceable back for generations. If 
continuous ancestral ties to the land could be demonstrated, their exclusive use 
was understood within the community and confirmed within the kipat system. 
In many of today’s nation states, the state itself is the authority of the land, 
however, “in the Kipat form of land ownership, […] the communal authority 
superseded any claim the state might extend” (Regmi 1976). Now, that did not 
imply that the use of the land was by any means communal. Each member took 
ownership of their own lands, and not all members of the community had access 
to their own kipat land. If a member of the community was to give up their land, 
its ownership would revert back to that of the community. This community 
ownership led to a permeation into traditional forms of governance known as 
subbas. Subba was the name given to the single male leader of Limbu 
communities under the kipat system. This position is, to date, carried from eldest 
son to eldest son through the surname of ‘Subba’ itself. These leaders were 
responsible for collecting taxes from kipat owners and investing those funds 
directly back into community development. As a kingdom of Limbuwan, this 
system functioned efficiently and as a point of identity for the Limbus of eastern 
Nepal. 
In the 18th century, King Prithvi Narayan Shah staged a series of takeovers 
of various feudal states in the unification of Nepal. This marked the first exposure 
for the people of the eastern hills, formerly Limbuwan, and many others within 
the borders of Nepal, to ideas of central governance. For the people of this region, 
a series of agreements with the royalty of the new Gorkhali empire left them 
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socially and economically speaking, nearly unaffected by this change. A 
proclamation to the Limbu chiefs of Pallokirat guaranteed them the permit to 
“enjoy their land from generation to generation, as long as it remains in 
existence.” If that did not guarantee their rights firmly enough, the royalty 
declared that: “In case we confiscate your lands, may our ancestral gods destroy 
our kingdom” (as cited in Regmi, 1963). Having securely retained the rights to 
govern their own land under kipat, they were simply incorporated into a larger 
identity of Nepal, the consequences of which seemed limited. 
Shortly after unification, the Shah dynasty came to an end, and as the 
Rana regime began, Nepal’s government began the process of slowly encroaching 
upon kipat. The rise of the raikar system of land tenure, one of state landlordism, 
helped to facilitate this challenge to kipat. With a history of feudal land 
management, raikar had been “sanctified both by law and by tradition” (Regmi, 
1976). With royal motivations to bring eastern Nepal under firm Nepalese control 
as a valuable piece of border territory, issues such as land tenure and taxation 
became integral to asserting central power over the region. In 1883, an order 
regarding Tiruwa Subbas in Pallokirat read that “If the customs and traditions of 
the Limbus are violated, they will leave the country and the government will be 
harmed” (as cited in Regmi, 1963). The tactical nature of this correspondence 
represents a slow and strategic process of slowly weaning Limbu communities 
away from kipat and therefore more firmly under the grasp of the Government of 
Nepal. 
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In 1883, legislation was passed that made this goal clear. It allowed for the 
conversion to raikar of kipat lands that had been leased to non-Kipat holders. As 
Lionel Caplan argues, this transition gave many Bahuns and Chetris, the ethnic 
groups of many tenants, the opportunity to challenge land rights of Limbus who 
were unaware of changing land politics. With this policy came a corollary that 
stated that any land, once converted to raikar tenure, could not be converted back 
to kipat tenure. This process lasted until 1901, when kipat lands could be 
mortgaged to non-Limbu community members and reclaimed immediately upon 
the repayment of such a loan however, many chose to repay the loan with the 
procurement of a higher bid from another tenant (Caplan 1970; Cox 1990). Many 
Limbus lost their land in these tenancy-based reclamations as kipat’s formal 
deconstruction began. These structural and strategic policy choices against the 
Limbus and their kipat system bred discontent against the Rana regime until 1964, 
when the Government of Nepal became more direct in its position against the 
kipat system. 
The Lands Act 2021 (1964) abolished the kipat system. It reads: “all the 
rights and authorities of the agents related with the Jimidari in the concerned area 
(Mouja) are ipso facto abolished.” The word, “jimidari” is used throughout this 
policy and is defined as “a system of collecting the revenue under the law and 
depositing, or causing to be deposited, such revenue with Government of Nepal, 
by making agent in the name of Jimidar, Patawari, Talukdar, Jimmawal, Mukhiya, 
Thari, Dware or in any other name.” This abolition gave the Government of Nepal 
the sole right to collect land taxes throughout the state, a right that before had 
 7 
been held by these aforementioned forms of local governance. Its Second 
Amendment four years later (1968) was an addition to the Lands Act that 
formally confronts the kipat system. It adds kipat to the list of labels defining the 
word “Jimidari” and contains Chapter 2. 3A “Provision on Kipat”. This provision 
allowed for the transfer of kipat lands by conveyance. As discussed above, the 
prevention of such conveyance was what created a kipat communities identified 
by ethnic singularity. This amendment also made kipat lands subject to land 
revenue under the raikar system, officially abolishing the practice of the system.2 
This policy declared all lands within the territory of Nepal as functioning 
under raikar, and this conversion, despite vocal opposition, has stood since. This 
transition stood to hold many negative impacts for the people of the Limbuwan 
region in exchange for political unification. With the ability to now sell their land, 
many Limbus, and many subbas specifically, quickly became landless. Members 
of high caste ethnic groups moved into Limbuwan, exploiting their social position 
by displacing and marginalizing Limbus. Finally, Limbus were incorporated into 
a political system within which they were set up to fail. Without an adequate 
preparation for such an incorporation, Limbus were left without advocates in 
Kathmandu, and thus without a voice in policy writing. These factors all 
contributed to a shift in local power dynamics and a political impoverishment of 
Limbu people.   
 
                                                
2 It is worth note that in Nepal, official English translations of federal policies do 
not exist. Thus all policies cited have been unofficially translated via the Law 




Two weeks were spent in Biblate, Ilam, Nepal exploring the legacy of a 
Limbu transition between self-governance and state integration. While census 
data is unavailable, local knowledge and observation found a significant portion 
of the population in this community identifying as Limbu. While the heart of 
Limbuwan and Limbu culture is commonly thought of as within the district of 
Panchthar (approximately 100 kilometers north), due to the developing nature of 
this study’s topic, it was not possible to pursue a study site in this location. The 
potential value of exploring these questions in Panchthar is not overlooked.  
It is worth note that during this study, regional election cycles were 
underway, making questions of a political nature particularly salient to 
participants.   
 
Changing Focus 
While this project began as an exploration of the persisting relationship 
between the kipat and raikar systems of land tenure, it became quickly evident 
that the specific topic of research would need to adapt to social conditions of the 
study site. The presence of two innately opposing systems of land tenure were 
poised to create noteworthy dynamics between traditional and modern 
governance. In Kathmandu, before departing for the study site, first interviews 
gave promising information to support this claim. However, upon speaking with 
members of the Biblate community, it was clear that such a relationship no longer 
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existed. When the kipat system was nullified in 1968, its practice came to a close. 
As far as study participants were concerned, there was no kipat, nor legacy, nor 
impact remaining. It persisted as simply a name. However, the sentiment: 
“Without kipat we have no rights” was one repeated from interview to interview. 
From that point, questions arose on the lasting impact that the dismantling of kipat 
had had on the Limbu communities in this region. With both a history of self- 
governance and integration into the state of Nepal, in what condition the Limbu 
political identity remained became the question of focus.  
What exactly specific words signified for the people of Biblate became a 
main point of discussion for this study. There were present, yet sparse, 
communication errors due to language barriers for both the author and the 
participants as many words took on different meanings as expected – particularly 
that of the words “kipat” and “legacy” (wirasat).  
According to local claims, kipat remains the label of nearly every parcel of 
land in the Biblate region, and is used casually to describe the land as such. The 
word kipat, despite this use, no longer refers to the traditional systems associated 
with it. Thus, when participants were asked if kipat was in use on their land, the 
answers would always be initially affirmative. When asked specifically about the 
kipat system, however, answers were always negative. This use of its name alone 
as a legacy of tradition was something that became clear from these responses. 
That said, when asked about such a legacy in Nepali, another issue of 
communication arose. The Nepali word for “legacy” (wirasat), signifies the 
tangible remaining aspects left behind by something in the past. As the Limbu 
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people of Biblate saw kipat as being itself expired, as far as many were 
concerned, a tangible legacy did not exist.  
Due to the evolving nature of this research as well as its brevity, this final 
project by no means represents a comprehensive view of this issue. Valuable 
perspectives have likely gone unheard and there are contributors to this theme that 
could not be fully explored. Organizations such as Kirat Yakthung Chumlung and 
Limbuwan Mukti Morcha could be subjects of a project of this nature in their own 
right. However, this paper’s basis is upon that of public opinion of the Limbu 
community within Biblate, thus the degree to which those topics are covered 
represents their relative importance as discussed by those interviewed. This paper 
by no means intends to belittle the contributions of these groups to these issues or 
their place in this discussion.  
 
Research Procedures 
Throughout this study, members of the Limbu community were contacted 
and interviewed with a semi-structured style. Most of the 15 interviews (12 men, 
3 women) were conducted in Nepali and limited English when possible. 
Translation as needed in Biblate was performed by Yam Bahadur Younghang 
Subba Limbu, a Limbu resident himself.  
Two interviews were performed in Kathmandu to provide precursory 
knowledge with the Minister of Land Reform and Management, Gopal Dahit, and 
a chair of the Community Self Reliance Center (CSRC), Jagat Deuja. Once in the 
field, community members along with those identified as members of a subba 
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lineage were interviewed specifically to learn of the transition away from late 
traditional governance. Members of local branches of three political parties 
(Communist Party of Nepal - Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), Nepali 
Congress, and Limbuwan Mukti Morcha) and a member of the local municipal 
board were interviewed to address issues of representation.  
While the purpose of these interviews was to gain an understanding of the 
current Limbu identity and how it fits into the current political atmosphere in 
Nepal, one must recognize that it is impossible to create a comprehensive, 
singular identity or experience for Limbu in politics. These community 
participants were asked questions concerning the influence of kipat on their own 
land, their thoughts on the Limbu condition in Nepalese politics, and how that has 
changed over time, in an attempt at beginning to piece together such an identity. 
Thus these interviews stand only as personal testimonials and opinions of the 
Limbu experience and status in Nepal’s modern political landscape.  
For a study dealing in interviews with community participants, ethical 
concerns must be addressed. Initially, a proposal of the project was reviewed 
through a process known as a local ethics review board. This board of three was 
made up of the academic director of the SIT NPR (Roland Pritchett), the senior 
lecturer of SIT NPR (Anil Chitrakar), and a language instructor of SIT NPR 
(Chandra Rana). This process ensured high standards for ethical considerations 
and any mitigation of their challenges.  
During the time spent at the study cite, issues of informed consent, 
inadvertent pressure to participate, and disclosure information were handled 
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through conversation with participants. These questions were discussed following 
each interview, so as to ensure that anything said during the interview process 
didn’t change the participant’s thoughts on disclosure. Whether or not names 
could be disclosed were discussed with participants from which quotes could be 
taken. Only those able to give informed consent (those over the age of 18 and able 
to answer questions of consent) were involved in this study, and any information 
used from those who took part in this study has been made available with their 
full knowledge and consent.  
In the face of a politically vulnerable population, an advocacy bias is, to 
some extent, unavoidable. All opinions presented in the following study results 
are those reported or described by those in participation of this study, and 
discussion of those results is as objective as possible. As YB Younghang Subba 
Limbu organized many of the interviews of this study, his personal bias must also 
be recognized as his association with the Limbu community and with Biblate 
holds possibilities for unknown personal motives.  
As mentioned, there is no way to adequately capture the identity of a 
population, and thus this study will undoubtedly leave opinions worth hearing out 
of the discussion. This paper stands to give recognition to those heard during this 
study and does not hope to silence opinions that this research failed to discover or 




Kipat Today  
Within contemporary literature concerning land management in Nepal, 
reports continue to list kipat as a major contributor to land tenure in Nepal. Before 
traveling to Ilam, The Community Self Reliance Center (CSRC), an NGO based 
in Kathmandu focused on issues of land rights throughout Nepal, stated that kipat 
remains in practice in 5% of all Nepali lands, as “unofficial” kipat (Jagat Deuja, 
personal communication, 9 Nov 2017). While the true meaning of “unofficial” 
kipat remains up for discussion, upon arrival in Biblate, it was found that every 
participant, when asked if the kipat system was used on personal lands, reported 
that it was not, with raikar having taken its place.  
With its ancestral ties to land rights, systems of inheritance, and granted 
access to natural resources remaining strong in Limbu tradition, many are 
continued in principle. That said, the importance of kipat to the modern Limbu 
identity in Biblate ranged. Upon arrival, Pushpa Bahadur Limbu, an elder farmer 
in the community stated that, “all land that you see here is kipat” (personal 
communication, 13 Nov 2017). And this type of identification was a recurring 
sentiment amongst the community. While most participants recognized the term, 
one, when asked whether or not her own land was formerly kipat, responded with 
confusion, and asked to be reminded what exactly kipat was (personal 
communication, 21 Nov 2017). With antithetical interviews, the name kipat 
remained as an identifier of Limbu heritage, although long since separated from 
its practice, to some more strongly than to others. Despite its significance ranging 
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within the community, many identified kipat as a type of local governance and as 
a past of a strong political identity. With its principles of taxation, its social 
structures, and its leadership, the Limbu political identity could be historically 
tied to kipat and today it persists as a legacy of Limbu heritage through its 
continued use.  
Kipat is reported on as being “old,” or even “ancient,” culture of the 
Limbu people (YB Subba, personal communication, 13 Nov 2017). Despite its 
age, its continued use (if as nothing but a label) represents the strength and value 
of its perception to the people of Biblate. Its continued relevance as told by the 
community makes it a worthwhile piece to include in the discussion of 
contemporary Limbu political identity.  
 
Looking back 
Many reported that the most significant difference between Limbu 
communities under kipat and those today was that land could now be sold or 
bought notwithstanding a buyer’s ethnic identity. This aspect of kipat had kept 
communities as entirely Limbu for centuries and kept them as “a singular 
economic group that could support each other” stated Tirtha Subba Limbu 
(personal communication, 20 Nov 2017). Some saw the loss of kipat thus as the 
breakdown of strongholds of Limbu culture, weakening their collective identity. 
As other ethnic groups moved in, and more Limbu people lost their land in the 
process, this amalgamation became associated with loss within the community. 
Others, such as Surendra Kumar Limbu, stated this past of kipat as detrimental to 
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the creation of a mixed society, a positive change in its absence (personal 
communication, 19 Nov 2017). Biblate, for example, has evidently seen such a 
transition, as have surrounding municipalities. With diversity a keystone for the 
new age Nepali identity, the loss of kipat brought around the possibility for such 
an ideal to be fulfilled in communities of the eastern hills.   
Many also pointed to sheer differences in taxation. Pre-kipat moratorium, 
it is reported that taxes were satisfyingly low. Kalagi Limbu, a local subba, 
reported that taxes were only two rupees when his grandfather once collected 
them (personal communication, 13 Nov 2017). Due to the nature of governance 
under kipat, taxation revenue was fully invested into community development 
making it, in the eyes of the community, more efficient. The change to the raikar 
system saw taxes increase substantially, and many reported that the government 
now takes half of their rice harvest each year. That increase in taxation would be 
undoubtedly necessary to facilitate effective central governance, however, the 
people of Biblate, and of Limbuwan in general, seem to not see the fruits of this 
taxation. With no effective representation in Kathmandu, the Limbu needs are not 
heard, and are thus likely not factored into the budgets that these tax revenues are 
funding.  
For those of a subba lineage, the change of the role of the subba was a 
noteworthy shift. As with the label of kipat, the name of subba became just a 
name during this transition. Formerly a point of governance, akin to a mayor, this 
position was stripped of its legitimacy when Limbu communities were fully 
incorporated into the Government of Nepal. Other types of governance such as a 
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subba exist in Nepal to date, such as the Thakali mukhiya, however, due to its 
close ties to the kipat system, when kipat was removed, the subba lost all of its 
power within the community (Tirtha Subba Limbu, personal communication, 20 
Nov 2017). A traditional figure, known for tax collecting, community 
organization, and giving tika during Dashain, the loss of the subba’s power stood 
as a visible legacy of kipat as those carrying its namesake discussed its removal.   
In the people’s history, the sentiments of the present ring strongly. 
Throughout these diverse differences between today to a time under a kipat at its 
heights, a romantic and positive past under kipat rang true with undertones of a 
discouraged present unfailingly persisting. 
 
Effective Mainstream? 
As Gopal Dahit, the current Minister of Land Reform and Management, 
stated “kipat was mainstreamed into federal policy in 1964” (personal 
communication, 8 Nov 2017). How effective this mainstreaming was, or even 
could be, clearly remains up to question when members of the Biblate community 
such as Sathendra Jabegu Limbu state that, “Without kipat, our economic 
condition, our political condition, our identity, is broken” (personal 
communication, 20 Nov 2017). By “mainstreamed,” Gopal Dahit has stated that 
Limbu people’s land was converted into raikar and they were allowed 
participation in the federal system. While they were not stripped of their lands, 
they were stripped of their rights to control them as they had always known. This 
final strike of unification – due to the strong ties to land ownership – replaced 
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pieces of Limbu culture and traditional practices, such as the subba and its 
associated systems of local taxation, and changed the face of Limbu communities.  
The people of Biblate also spoke of the poor economic condition of the 
Limbu people overall today in comparison to before kipat’s expulsion. There is no 
economic data available to support these claims, but the idea that Limbu are poor, 
or at least more so than they have been in the past, was a resounding sentiment 
during interviews in Biblate. And this impoverishment was not only reported 
upon economic grounds, as Jit Bahadur Limbu stated that without kipat, Limbu 
people have “no rights” (personal communication, 14 Nov 2017). As kipat 
represented a political freedom for Limbus, the loss of the system has been 
associated with a loss of rights. The rights to self-determination appeared to have 
been stripped with the removal of the kipat system, creating a sense of political 
hopelessness. A perception of rights under the Government of Nepal does not 
exist for many members of this community.  
The ability to participate brings the efficacy of the Limbu incorporation 
into question. When Limbus were fully incorporated into Nepal’s burgeoning 
democracy, many had no perception of systems of state governance. Tirtha Subba 
Limbu stated that democracy and communism were new ideas presented to the 
Limbus that they were frankly unaware of, and the government did not help them 
to understand them (personal communication, 20 Nov 2017). As kipat had been, 
until that point, one of few outlets for Limbu political expression, concepts for 
governing nation states were completely foreign. Within a burgeoning democracy, 
such as the one that Nepal was still very much so in the process of creating in 
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1968, Limbus were unable to advocate for themselves. Kusha Bahadur Limbu, a 
member of Nepali Congress, stated that the reason for this failure of incorporation 
was, at its heart, an issue of education. He emphasized the control that the Rana 
regime of the time had over education and thus prevented access to lower caste 
groups, such as Limbus (personal communication, 23 Nov 2017).  
For Limbus, mostly living in the foothills of eastern Nepal, the question of 
physical access holds as much weight in their ability to influence politics in the 
Kathmandu Valley as does ideological access. As many of the Limbu in Biblate 
identified the Limbu by their aforementioned impoverishment, such access is not 
feasible for most. Without a physical presence in Kathmandu or an outlet through 
which their voice may be heard, it is easy for the Government of Nepal to turn 
their back on the Limbu. A lack of access can also be looked at as less of a spatial 
access but one of a discriminatory nature. Many participants cited Bahuns and 
Chetris as those who have representation in Parliament and those falling lower in 
the caste system are unable to transcend this systematic discrimination.   
Under current political conditions, people of Limbu heritage are left with 
sparse representation in local government. As Thako Shrestha identified the 
causes of this lack of participation as illiteracy and poverty, both legacies of 
kipat’s removal. As a part of the local municipal board, he stated that one member 
of the five-person board identifies as Limbu (personal communication, 23 Nov 
2017). However, he is optimistic, as a member of the Newar community in 
Biblate, saying that their political situation is “on the rise” with representation 
having increased in the past few years (personal communication, 23 Nov 2017). 
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It became clear that no major political parties currently stand to represent 
the Limbu identity in Kathmandu. When Gopal Parsal Nepal, a current district 
CPN-UML member, was asked, he stated that CPN-UML’s policies stand to 
represent all, and thus they do not appeal specifically to the Limbu identity 
(personal communication, 22 Nov 2017). Support for CPN-UML is strong 
throughout Nepal, with communism’s positive reputation amongst those who see 
their communities in need of economic augmentation and Limbus are not an 
exception to this. As for Nepali Congress, the other major player in the political 
sphere, one local leader, Kusha Bahadur Limbu, reported that “Nepali Congress 
never discusses the Limbu voice” (personal communication, 23 Nov 2017). Many 
spoke of having compromised on their identity being represented in the political 
sphere. Instead, when time comes to cast votes, voting based on other issues, such 
as economic policy and development, seems more viable and worthwhile. 
 
Moving Forward  
 Since the removal of kipat and the attempted integration into the state of 
Nepal, the Limbu community has been working to find their place within 
Nepalese politics. A minor political party, Limbuwan Mukti Morcha (Limbuwan), 
has emerged to fill this gap in political identity with hopes to reclaim the Limbu 
heritage, however, it has failed to garner significant support from its intended 
constituency. Along with this party, Limbus are active in the NGO sector, mainly 
through a group known as Kirat Yakthung Chumlung (KYC).  
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Identified as an “regional liberation front” the Limbuwan Mukti Morcha 
(Limbuwan) party looks to bring about the national recognition of the late 
Limbuwan state as its own semi-autonomous region. Among 15 other similar 
parities born post-Maoist movement, Limbuwan was created to give Limbus a 
voice in politics and vocalize the argument that “each ethnic group should control 
a region of the country” (Hangen 2009). Along with the recognition of the 
Limbuwan state, the revival of the kipat system is something that this party has set 
their sights on. This party is present only in districts that were once a part of 
Limbuwan, remaining absent from discussion in Kathmandu. Despite the goal of 
bringing Limbuwan back as a semi-autonomous state, Purna Patra Limbu stated 
that “Nepal is our country, Limbuwan is our home” reaffirming a national identity 
that would be thought rare within a liberation front (personal communication, 23 
Nov 2017).  
Purna Patra Limbu attributed the lack of support from a majority of the 
Limbu community to a lack of education on the Limbuwan state. To make up for 
that shortcoming, the party has been campaigning door-to-door to educate Limbu 
people and sway votes in their favor. He also emphasized that many educated and 
skilled Limbus, those who would supposedly support the party, are leaving the 
country, leaving only those who are uneducated about issues of cultural heritage 
behind. He admitted that major issues within party leadership has lead to the 
fracturing of the Limbuwan party in three parts. These factions each draw 
different support over differing policies, something that was not able to be fully 
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explored in this project, due to the presence of only one faction in this community 
(personal communication, 23 Nov 2017).  
The opinions on the Limbuwan party in Biblate are varied. Many people 
when asked about the Limbuwan party cited issues with party leadership, 
management of donation funds, corruption, ineffective ideas, and a misuse of 
Limbu demands among their reasons for not casting votes in support of 
Limbuwan. One even cited a thirst for revolution as his main issue with the party. 
Surendra Kumar Limbu simply stated that the Limbuwan party, “refuses to carry 
the burdens of the current situation of Limbu people” (personal communication, 
19 Nov 2017). And one Limbu man, when asked about his own political leanings 
said that he was basically Limbuwan, but when the time came to vote, would vote 
with the Communist Party.  
Many consider the Limbuwan party as lying on the fringe of the political 
battleground thus Limbus frequently choose to place their votes elsewhere with 
hopes of seeing more tangible change. “With Limbu’s caste status, it is not a good 
way to get representation” said Tirtha Subba Limbu (personal communication, 20 
Nov 2017). Sita Limbu emphasized that Limbus are not a large enough group for 
voting with their identity to help with bigger issues, such as development 
(personal communication, 22 Nov 2017). Compromising on Limbu identity and 
the hope of representation, many are choosing larger, and thus more feasible 
parties to bring about change for Nepal. 
Despite having attended one of their programs held in Ilam Bazaar, the 
author was unable to contact Kirat Yaktung Chumlung during this study. Clearly 
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an integral piece of modern Limbu political activism, it’s role stands to be further 
explored. Stated as the best available outlet for Limbu identity expression by 
Surendra Kumar Limbu, its role in this Limbu identity can only be recognized as 
far as limited testimony (personal communication, 19 Nov 2017). 
These advocacy groups and individuals have recently begun to lower their 
expectations of the Government of Nepal, requesting more attainable forms of 
reconciliation. According to one community member, KYC is now seeking that 
compensations should be given for losses during the transition between systems 
as opposed to a full restoration of kipat (personal communication, 19 Nov 2017). 
Along with these decreased demands, both Limbuwan Mukti Morcha and Kirat 
Yaktung Chumlung have supposedly begun working with other political parties 
and organizations, lobbying to have their voices heard in more powerful places.  
With weak representation today, using these outlets to garner advocacy is 
adaptive in the face of systematic adversity.  
When asked how change will come for Limbu people, Pushpa Bahadur 
Limbu stated, “Kipat must return” (personal communication, 13 Nov 2017). This 
rebirth was supported amongst the community, as a supposed “struggle” towards 
that end is and has been ongoing, presumably from Limbuwan and the KYC 
themselves. Despite this “struggle”, a declared lack of power continues to prevent 
much forward progress. Sathendra Jabegu Limbu stated that if kipat were to 
return, he believed that with it, land would be returned to the community and that 
economic growth and political freedom would come as well (personal 
communication, 20 Nov 2017). It is widely recognized that such a rebirth is not 
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possible and will not happen, frequently citing a lack of rights and power as 
reasons to doubt its feasibility. Surendra Kumar Limbu stated that “If it came 
back, that would be great for me and my community, but it is not possible.” He 
followed that with emphasizing that in reality, kipat only helps Limbu people, and 
is help that he doesn’t see as necessary to the viability of the Limbu culture 
(personal communication, 19 Nov 2017). A self identified cultural strength stands 
as a bellwether for a steady progress towards adequate representation and 
cohesive political identity.  
Conclusion 
With unification such as Nepal’s, one must look at the drivers of such 
unification and who are left on the margins, as tools to an end. This history has 
created a problematic nature of a singular Nepalese identity, one that too often 
fails to consider the staggering ethnic diversity of the nation. While many ethnic 
groups today are happy to identify as Nepali, beneath that, diverse traditions and 
legacies remain. The policies of the 1960s put singular identity above diversity in 
exchange for what was seen as valuable unifying policy; shaking Limbu tradition 
in its wake.  
Due to the developing nature of this project, many nuances of the 
transition away from kipat were not fully explored through this study. However, 
the idea of today’s powerless Limbu, one without rights, without a voice, was 
constantly described in Biblate. While Limbus did not express a presence of 
active oppression, a negative political outlook rang true for most participants. In 
attempting to abolish a system such as kipat, the Government of Nepal did not 
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prepare the people operating under its hand for such a change. Such a failed 
“mainstreaming” left Limbus on the outside of the Government of Nepal. With 
groups such as the Limbuwan Mukti Morcha and Kirat Yakthung Chumlung 
having emerged, the voice of the Limbu people is beginning to crescendo towards 
Kathmandu. These steps, while not near fulfillment, have started a successful 
campaign towards a long needed representation. 
Kipat remains salient for members of the Limbu community in Biblate in 
varying degrees, whether as simply a label, or as a heritage of successful self-
governance. With ties to Limbu heritage, it is a reminder of a time of political 
freedom and autonomy. Nearly 70 years later, a connection between the expulsion 
of the kipat system and the Limbu relationship with the Government of Nepal 
remains. Further exploration into this connection, through other communities and 
contexts, as well as through groups such as Kirat Yakthung Chumlung and 
Limbuwan Mukti Morcha, must be done in order to gain a more comprehensive 
view of this case study in ethnic politics. That said, with a strong identity of local 
politics from which a Limbu could create their own vision of successful 
governance, this study has discovered that the Limbu place in Nepal’s political 
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